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Abstract
Using an original database of 614 judgements in the French supreme courts from 1956 to
2010, we test for possible biases in judges’ decisions in the field of environmental accidents,
focusing on a difference in treatment between private parties and the government as litigant.
Two separate institutions deal with environmental cases in France, namely the Conseil d’E´tat
(Supreme Administrative Tribunal) for public utilities and central and local government, and
the Cour de cassation (Supreme Civil Court) for private firms. We run bivariate Probit regres-
sions to explain pro-defendant decisions and reversals of decisions. Overall, courts treat
plaintiffs and defendants differently. A pro-defendant decision and a reversal of decision are
less likely to occur: (i) when the appeal is initiated by the defendant rather than by the plain-
tiff; (ii) in the Conseil d’E´tat rather than in the Cour de cassation. The Conseil d’E´tat is harsher
with defendants than the Cour de cassation. These results could be indicative of a bias of the
lower administrative tribunals in favor of public utilities and/or the government.
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Keywords: environmental accidents, French cases, litigation, Appellate Courts, judicial review,
judicial behavior, biased judges, administrative tribunals.
∗We thank Julie Le Gallo for helpful comments and suggestions, together with participants in the 31st Annual
Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics (EALE), Aix-en-Provence, France, September 2014, the First
Annual Conference of the French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (FAERE), Montpellier, Septem-
ber 2014, the International Meeting in Law and Economics, Nanterre, March 2014, and in the 23ie`mes Rencontres de
l’environnement (FAERE), Le Havre, March 2014. The research leading to these results has received funding from the
Institut Universitaire de France (IUF).
‡Universite´ de Paris 2 (CRED). Email: pierre.bentata@u-paris2.fr.
††Universite´ de Franche-Comte´ (CRESE) and Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), France. E-mail:
yolande.hiriart@univ-fcomte.fr.
1 Introduction
Basic justice would seem to require that the law should deal in the same way with individuals
in similar circumstances. However, studies of adjudications in various countries and domains
in recent decades reveal that litigants may be treated differently depending on their standing:
for instance, one can find a difference of treatment between employers and employees in labor
courts, but also between debtors and creditors in bankruptcy courts and, more often, between
plaintiffs and defendants. In the last category, studies have particularly focused on the difference
between private parties and the government as litigants.
In the context of environmental accidents, one might wonder whether cases involving public
utilities or central or local government receive any particular treatment. Environmental acci-
dents are usually caused by corporate entities, be they public or private. However, individuals
that are representatives of the State, such as the mayor or the local chief of the police (Pre´fet), may
also find themselves in court, as defendants, because they have permitted an activity that has
caused environmental damage or generated a risk of future environmental harm. The French le-
gal system separates cases involving public utilities and the government1 from cases involving
private corporations. Indeed, cases follow different routes: (i) those implicating private compa-
nies are first judged in a standard civil court (Cour de premie`re instance) then appeals ultimately
go to the Cour de cassation (Supreme Civil Court); (ii) cases implicating public utilities or the gov-
ernment are first judged in an administrative tribunal then appeals ultimately go to the Conseil
d’E´tat (Supreme Administrative Court).
In this paper, we test for a possible bias of judges in the supreme instances when determining
French environmental cases.
As is common in the literature on courts’ biases, we focus on the severity of judges with respect
to one type of litigants. For this purpose, we first test for a possible difference in the win rates of
defendants between the two highest courts. This literature has sustained the idea that reversal
by upper courts of decisions taken by lower courts could be the signal of corrective behavior by
the former, for they believe lower courts are biased. We thus scrutinize these reversal decisions
in the two highest courts in France. In addition, we provide novel insights by analyzing supreme
1By abuse of terminology, any representative of the State will be referred to as the government: in the present
context, these representatives are often the mayor or the local chief of police.
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courts decisions to refer cases back to lower courts and tribunals for adjudication as a proxy for
supreme courts trust in those bodies in the capacity to review the cases.
The observations come from an original database covering 614 judgments of the highest courts
(the entire set of French environmental cases) for the period 1956-2010.2 One difficulty is that
there are two separate jurisdictions. However, the database offers control variables to ensure
that differences in the decisions really come from judges’ behavior and not from other factors
like differences in safety policy.3
We run bivariate Probit regressions to explain pro-defendant and reversal decisions. We find a
difference in the treatment of plaintiffs and defendants in both estimations.4 A pro-defendant
decision and a reversal of decision are less likely to occur: (i) when the appeal is initiated by
the defendant rather than the plaintiff; (ii) in the Conseil d’E´tat rather than the Cour de cassation.
Last, the estimation on referral decisions shows that the Conseil d’E´tat sends less cases back to
the lower courts than the Cour de cassation. Assuming that the intensity of referral decisions
is a proxy for the degree of trust of an upper court toward lower ones,5 this last result could
be indicative of less trust from the Conseil d’E´tat. This additional result reinforces the main
findings: (i) overall, upper courts treat plaintiffs and defendants differently, with a pro-plaintiff
bias; (ii) the Conseil d’E´tat is harsher on defendants than the Cour de cassation. In accordance
with the related literature, we could interpret this as corrective behavior: this pro-plaintiff bias
revealed in upper courts could indeed correct for a pro-defendant bias in lower courts, and this
would be particularly the case from administrative tribunals towards public utilities and/or the
government.
There exists a substantial empirical literature on litigation, even when restricted to courts’ de-
2See Bentata (2013, 2014).
3However, it is true that there could be a difference between civil and administrative law, and cases themselves
can be intrinsically different between the two branches.
4It should be clear at this point that a defendant in our analysis is always a firm that caused environmental harm
and the plaintiff is the victim. No party can change her status from plaintiff to defendant and vice-versa, just be filing
an appeal in the upper court. Hence, when analyzing a difference of treatment between plaintiffs and defendants
in the Conseil d’E´tat, there is no ambiguity: we analyze a difference of treatment between private parties and the
government as a litigant.
5Indeed, in French law, Supreme Courts judge the application of the law itself. Consequently, when they reverse a
decision, they have to send the case back to a lower court (Art. 625 and 626 of the Code de proce´dure civile for the Cour
de cassation and Art. L821-2 of the Code de la justice administrative for the Conseil d’E´tat). However, both courts can
provide a final decision if they consider that “lower courts do not have jurisdiction” (Art. L627 of the Code de la proce´dure
civile referring to Art. L411-3 of the Code de l’organisation judiciaire) or that making a final decision “is in the best interest
of the administration of justice”. Hence, Supreme Courts have some room to ultimately adjudicate cases they have to
review (see Bore´, 2011).
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cisions and their possible biases.6 This literature has mainly studied biases in favor of defen-
dants versus plaintiffs, but also biases for the government against private litigants, employers
against employees, and debtors against creditors. It has been enriched by taking into account
the selection effect (see below), judges’ career concerns, judges’ political preferences, social or
economic conditions, the composition of courts, case categories, gender, religion, but also appel-
late judges’ misperceptions of the lower courts’ attitude. Let us try to give a brief overview of
the most closely related papers.
Our main results run counter to the conclusion of quite a number of quantitative studies in which
defendants outperform plaintiffs on civil appeals. Among the studies carried out on U.S. fed-
eral and state intermediate appellate courts, Clermont and Eisenberg (1992) show that plaintiffs’
win rates before juries or judges differ significantly.7 More importantly for our purpose, using
data on all U.S. federal civil trials and appeals from 1988 to 2000, Clermont and Eisenberg (2001,
2002) show that defendants succeed more than plaintiffs on appeal from civil trials, explaining
this by appellate judges’ attitudes.8 This difference is confirmed by Eisenberg (2004) for federal
courts data covering all case categories, and the appellate court effect is confirmed for employ-
ment discrimination cases.9 However, it should be mentioned that Eisenberg and Farber (2013)
provide evidence that the plaintiffs’ lower success rate on appeal can be due to them pursuing
lawsuits even when they should win on the merits less than half the time. The lower success
rate on appeal thus may not find its origin in appellate judges’ attitude. Last, Eisenberg, Fisher,
and Rosen-Zvi (2011) do not find evidence of asymmetric reversal rates favoring defendants in
the Israeli Supreme Court’s appellate cases.
A strand of literature analyzes the possible bias of judges in connection with economic condi-
tions. This is the purpose of Ichino, Polo, and Rettore (2003) and Marinescu (2011) who show
that labor market conditions influence courts’ decisions. Lambert Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhu-
6Theoretical analyzes have also been developed on judicial bias and its consequences for efficiency, but their focus
is a little far from our own. See Miceli (2009, 2010), for instance, or Gennaioli and Rossi (2010) and Gennaioli (2013).
One should also mention Shavell (1995)’s study of the error correction with the appeal process.
7This may not be due to a difference between the behavior of juries and judges, but rather to the fact that attorneys
select and submit cases to juries that are particularly difficult to win for plaintiffs.
8Using data on all terminated cases in the federal courts from 1988 to 1997, Clermont and Eisenberg (2000) reveal
the same anti-plaintiff effect: defendants succeed significantly more often on appeal from civil trials than plaintiffs,
and specially from jury trials. Authors attribute this appellate judges’ attitude to their perception of a pro-plaintiff
bias at trial court level. Using a unique dataset on a comprehensive cohort of tried state court cases, Eisenberg and
Heise (2009) obtain similar results from 8038 trials and 549 concluded appeals from 46 large counties in the U.S.,
confirming the main findings from federal courts.
9Both Clermont and Eisenberg (2001) and Eisenberg (2004) confirm the appellate court effect, meaning judges’
attitude, even when taking into account the different trial-win rates - the case selection process - mentioned below.
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ravskaya (2006) show that regional political characteristics together with the quality of the re-
gional judiciary affect judicial decisions about the numbers and types of bankruptcy procedures
in Russia. The effect of judges’ political preferences on case outcomes is studied by Ashenfelter
et al. (1995), Choi and Gulati (2008) and Hall (2010). Other authors study the effect of gender
(Choi et al., 2011, Greiner and Rubin, 2011, Bogoch and Don-Yechiya, 1999) and religion (Gazal-
Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010).
A recurrent message in this literature is that when analyzing courts’ decisions, one cannot ignore
that the set of lawsuits and plaintiffs is far from a random selection among potential claims and
potential claimants. Indeed, the cases are not representative of the entire population initially,
nor the set of potential claimants, but themselves result from a selection process. Priest and
Klein (1984) have advanced this theory, which was further developed and tested by Waldfogel
(1995), Eisenberg (1991) and Eisenberg and Farber (1997, 2003). The central point of the selection
process theory remains that one should be careful when drawing inferences about the legal
system from studies of tried cases. In our analysis, outcomes before higher courts are favorable
to plaintiffs: we suggest an interpretation in which the upper courts adopt corrective behavior.
However, we should keep in mind that this success rate for plaintiffs could also come from the
fact that cases where defendants could win have not reached the upper court level. In any case,
we cannot control for case selection at this stage since we lack the history of our cases, and thus
the information on what happened in lower courts.
The paper closest to ours remains Amaral-Garcia and Garoupa (2012) who test for the bias of
administrative tribunals in favor of the government in the field of medical malpractice in Spain.
It is remarkable that our main result departs from theirs: whereas they find no clear evidence
that administrative tribunals decide more favorably for the defendants than civil courts, we
show a different treatment of defendants by the Conseil d’E´tat that could suggest the reverse.
Our result on tougher decisions by the Conseil d’E´tat against defendants - public utilities and the
government - contrasts with Eisenberg, Fisher, and Rosen-Zvi (2011), who find the government
to be a highly successful litigant both in obtaining review from the Israeli Supreme Court and in
obtaining reversal of judgments it appealed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts the legal background. Section 3 describes
the dataset. Section 4 reports the estimations and provides the main results. Section 5 briefly
concludes by pointing out avenues for further work.
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2 The legal background
2.1 The French legislation
In France, as in many civil law countries, there is a separation between civil courts and adminis-
trative tribunals. Civil courts deal with disputes between private parties whereas administrative
subject-matter jurisdiction deal with the powers of the administrative authorities and their re-
lation with private parties. More precisely, in environmental cases, a dispute will be tried in
administrative tribunals if the defendant is a public legal person, a state-owned company or a
private company entitled to provide public services and exercising an administrative authority.10
Otherwise, they are subject to civil law, even though they provide public goods and services.11
Hence, environmental administrative litigations may concern either a controversy over a deci-
sion of a state official (e.g. authorization to start up a potentially environmentally unfriendly
activity, implementation of a controversial local regulation, or stringency of an environmental
impact assessment) or a dispute over an action by a public defendant that resulted in harm to
private plaintiffs.
The main reason for such a distinction between private and public defendants lies in the fact
that ”public authorities have specific powers and obligations that require that their action should not
be reviewed by ordinary courts” (Frydman, 2008). Consequently, the determination of liability is
different in administrative tribunals and civil courts. In civil law, fault-based liability is the
rule (except for the most environmentally unfriendly facilities called ICPE facilities,12 which are
subject to strict liability) and the criterion for negligence is the reasonable man standard (bon
pe`re de famille). In administrative law, the standard of due care is much higher as state-owned
companies and state officials have an obligation of sanitary security13 and cannot claim that
their level of care was limited by a budget constraint.14 Furthermore, the procedures are also
different. The procedure before administrative tribunals is inquisitorial (inquisitoire) whereas
10Private companies with a public service mission are subject to administrative law if they are entitled to take
administrative decisions, i.e. pre´rogative de puissance publique. See Arreˆt Magnier in CE January 1961, 13th, and CE May
1991, 15th, Association Girondins de Bordeaux FC.
11Tribunal des Conflits, November 1995, 27th, Le Troedec, and Arreˆt Temier in CE February 1903, 6th.
12Installations classe´es pour la protection de l’environnement.
13The first reference to this obligation appeared in 1902 (Law of February 1902, 15th, relative to the protection of
public health). The criterion became more stringent over the century as many public health and environmental scan-
dals occurred. For instance, the State has been condemned for ”public health deficiencies” in the HIV-contaminated
blood affair (CE April 1992, 9th, n.138653) and in the asbestos affair (CE March 2004, 3rd n.241153).
14Cass. Crim., July 2nd 1998, n.97-83.286.
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the civil procedure is accusatorial (accusatoire). This means that administrative tribunals direct
the course of the procedure, and are in charge of finding out the facts that may be relevant for
their decisions (Frydman, 2008). Consequently, administrative judges have more scope than
civil judges to make their decisions. Hence, if judges are likely to be biased, the effect would be
greater in administrative tribunals.
2.2 The appeal process
Civil courts and administrative tribunals are organized along similar lines. Both are pyrami-
dal with the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’E´tat respectively at the apex of the civil and
the administrative branches. Civil and administrative cases are respectively first tried in Cours
d’Instance and in Cours Administratives d’Instance, and can be appealed in Cours d’Appel and in
Cours Administratives d’Appel. As far as litigation is concerned,15 the Cour de cassation and the
Conseil d’E´tat share a common feature: both have to harmonize case law to ensure that texts are
interpreted in the same way nationwide.16 Moreover, they do not rule on the merits of a case, but
rather on the proper application of the rules by lower courts (i.e. both Supreme Courts judge the
decisions of lower courts). Hence, even though administrative and civil rules might differ, the
task of judges from both Supreme Courts is similar. Consequently, observing Supreme Courts’
decisions is relevant when comparing the application of the law by lower civil and administra-
tive courts.
2.3 Professional backgrounds of administrative and civil judges
In France, administrative and civil laws are considered as very different branches of law, with
their own logic and their own process. For this reason, administrative and civil judges often
have very different backgrounds.
Civil judges have a special statutory protection (referred to as Magistrat). To become civil judges,
candidates have to attend the National School for the Judiciary (E´cole Nationale de la Magistrature)
for a period of 31 months. There are three different competitive examinations depending on the
applicant’s professional experience: the first one is open to students with a Master degree in law
15Indeed, the Conseil d’E´tat exercises two different roles: it is not only the Supreme Court of the administrative
jurisdiction but also the most important legal advisor to the Government.
16See About the Court, Cour de Cassation, www.courdecassation.fr/about the court 9256.html.
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who are at least 27 years of age. The second and third ones are open to people who already
have a substantial experience in the legal domain. The vast majority of civil judges come from
the first examination process (e.g. in 2006, 88% of newly graduated judges where former Law
Master students who entered the National School for the Judiciary through the first examination
process).17 As a result, the majority of successful candidates begin their professional careers as
civil judges and most of them remain civil judges until retirement.
Things are quite different for administrative judges. First of all, they are usually civil servants
and not Magistrats: they do not benefit from the same level of protection and independence as
the latter with respect to the State. Second, except for judges from the Conseil d’E´tat who, for
the majority, attended the National School of Administration (E´cole Nationale d’Administration)
after a tough competitive examination, administrative judges are recruited among civil servants,
lawyers and high level law graduates. This is due to the gap between the low number of stu-
dents that intend to become administrative judges and the need for a growing number of judges
in recent decades. As a matter of fact, over the last decade, only 19% of the new administrative
judges did not exercise as civil servants in the past.18 This means that 81% of the new admin-
istrative judges used to work with state officials and local authorities, i.e. the parties they may
have to judge. This situation is favorable to the emergence of sympathy towards a group (the
group of public agents) to whom administrative judges used to belong to. Such a context can
potentially give rise to a pro-defendant bias.
However, since judges from the Conseil d’E´tat are career judges who have never had professional
relationships with public agents, for most of them, such a bias is unlikely.19 A natural way for
these judges to correct a possible pro-defendant bias from administrative judges is to adopt a
pro-plaintiff behavior. A pro-plaintiff bias in the Conseil d’E´tat would then be interpreted as
corrective behavior with respect to some failings of lower administrative tribunals.
17See the statistics provided by the Cour de cassation on its website:
http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf 2007/10-05-2007/10-05-2007 mcKee fr.pdf.
18See the statistics provided by the Cour de cassation on its website:
http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf 2007/10-05-2007/10-05-2007 recrutement adm.pdf.
19A few words on how people get to be members of the Conseil d’E´tat may be useful at this point. Each year, five
positions of auditors (Auditeurs) are made available to the top graduates of the National School of Administration.
After four years, an auditor is promoted to master of petitions (Maıˆtre des requeˆtes) and after twelve years, to the level
of judge (Conseiller d’E´tat). Promotion is based exclusively on seniority which assures independence and impartiality
in the promotion of members. Recruitment by external appointment accounts for one out of four masters of petitions
and one out of three judges. A number of external appointments, upon the nomination of the Vice-President of the
Conseil d’E´tat, is reserved for members of the administrative tribunals and the administrative appellate courts. See
the website of the Conseil d’E´tat: http://english.conseil-etat.fr/.
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3 The Database
To observe whether judges treat plaintiffs and defendants differently, we study the entire set of
decisions of the Cour de cassation and Conseil d’E´tat about environmental accidents and damage
between 1956 and 2010. Our database is constructed from two French official legal search en-
gines that list all cases before the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’E´tat since 1956. To collect
the entire set of environmental cases we used the following keywords: pollution, nuisance to
neighborhood (trouble de voisinage), environmental damage, environmental risk, environmental
harm, ecological risk, ecological harm, ICPE, Seveso, IPPC,20 and risk prevention. We obtained
614 different cases. In the following subsections, we present the variables of interest and a set of
control variables. All the variables are dummy variables noted “1” when present in cases and
“0” otherwise.
3.1 Dependent variables: judges’ decisions
We focus on three dependent variables to observe whether judges have a pro-plaintiff bias and
to compare administrative and civil judges in terms of severity. The first is “pro-defendant
decisions” (Prodef ), noted 1 when judges rule in favor of the defendant and 0 otherwise. The
second is “reversal decisions” (Reverse), noted 1 when judges reverse the decision of the lower
court and 0 otherwise.21 Finally, the third variable to be tested is “referral decisions” (Refer), and
is noted 1 when judges from either the Cour de cassation or the Conseil d’E´tat send the case back
to the lower court.22
3.2 Explanatory variables
For each set of regressions, we observe the impact of two explanatory variables: Defendant appeal
and Conseil d’E´tat. Defendant appeal is noted 1 when the defendant appeals the decision of the
lower court and 0 when the plaintiff appeals.23 This variable helps determine whether judges’
20For Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control. See European Directive EC 96/61 imposing the application of the
“Best Available Technology” principle to polluting facilities.
21Cases in which judges partly reverse lower courts’ decisions are noted 1.
22Referral decisions are more likely to occur when judges decided first to reverse, partly reverse or partly confirm
lower courts decisions. Econometrically, this implies that the set of regressions concerning referral decisions may
suffer from endogeneity. Though, our database does not allow us to define any instrument variable to deal with such
endogeneity problems. Consequently, results from this set of regressions must be interpreted with caution.
23In our database, there is only one appellant in each case.
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decisions differ when the identity of the appellant changes. More precisely, if judges’ decisions
to reverse the ruling of a lower court are negatively correlated with this variable, we would
interpret it as evidence of a pro-plaintiff bias.24 This hypothesis (H1) is the first to be tested.
The most important variable of interest is “Conseil d’E´tat”. It is noted 1 when the final appeal
is reviewed by the Conseil d’E´tat and 0 when reviewed by the Cour de cassation. This variable
helps determine whether being judged by the Conseil d’E´tat instead of the Cour de cassation is
likely to change the result of litigation, all other things being equal. First, if the chances of a
pro-defendant (resp. pro-plaintiff ) outcome are lower (higher) in the Conseil d’E´tat than in the
Cour de cassation, this implies that the Conseil d’E´tat has a pro-plaintiff bias. We would interpret
this result as the willingness of judges from the Conseil d’E´tat to correct a pro-defendant bias of
administrative tribunals (H2). Likewise, if the Conseil d’E´tat is less likely to refer cases back to
lower courts than the Cour de cassation, this would imply that judges from the Conseil d’E´tat are
less confident in the capacity of lower courts to correctly adjudicate cases. Again, this would be
interpreted as further evidence of the existence of a pro-defendant bias in lower courts (H3).
We can summarize our main hypotheses to be tested as follows:
H1. Appeal by the defendant decreases the probability of a reversal. Judges from the Conseil
d’E´tat and the Cour de cassation have a pro-plaintiff bias.
H2. The probability of a pro-defendant outcome is lower in the Conseil d’E´tat. Judges from
the Conseil d’E´tat tend to be “pro-plaintiff” to correct the pro-defendant bias of administrative
tribunals’ judges.
H3. The probability of a referral decision is lower in the Conseil d’E´tat. Judges from the Conseil
d’E´tat are more likely to enter definitive rulings than judges from the Cour de cassation as they
consider that administrative judges from lower courts are biased.
3.3 Control variables
Environmental lawsuits may be brought for different reasons and may involve different natural
assets. To cope with this heterogeneity and its potential influence over the correlation we want
to observe, we control several aspects of an environmental lawsuit: (i) did the defendant com-
24Remember that a defendant in our database is always a firm that created losses and that her status cannot change
- i.e., she cannot become a plaintiff - when going from Appellate to Supreme Court.
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ply with regulatory norms and standards? (ii) Which legal grounds have been invoked by the
appellant? (iii) Which natural assets have been damaged?
i) Compliance with regulation is a dummy variable, noted 1 if the defendant complied with
regulations and 0 otherwise.
ii) Legal grounds describe the legal basis used by the appellant to get her case to the Con-
seil d’E´tat or Cour de cassation. In our database, we observed five different legal grounds:
disagreement on the amount of compensation (which we take as our reference variable),
disagreement on the relevance of the proof of wrongful or negligent behavior (Proof ), dis-
agreement with lower court’s treatment of causation (Causality), disagreement with lower
court’s treatment of the uncertainty about the consequences - in the case of a lawsuit pri-
marily brought by potential victims claiming that a given activity imposes an imminent
risk of accident - (Uncertainty), and disagreement on the due process of law or on the legal
procedure followed by the lower court (Procedure).
iii) Natural assets are classified as follows: water (reference variable), soil, air, sea, and noise.
Finally, some private firms may be entitled to provide public services (see Section 2). In this
case, they are either subject to civil law if they provide a public service but do not exercise any
administrative authority, or to administrative law if they provide a public service and exercise
an administrative authority (mission de service public avec pre´rogatives de puissance publique). Given
the nature of their activity, these firms may be more likely to influence lower courts’ judges. Con-
sequently the variable Public service is used to observe whether both the Conseil d’E´tat and Cour
de cassation are harsher when dealing with these private firms. Should this be the case, we would
interpret this result as evidence that both civil courts and administrative tribunals tend to favor
defendants who are connected with the government. In other words, this variable helps control
for a potential pro-plaintiff bias due to the nature of the defendant’s activity. Our hypothesis is
that this variable should not have any significant influence if judges from lower administrative
tribunals have a pro-defendant bias, but not judges from lower civil courts. Indeed, if only the
lower administrative tribunals favor the private firms which provide public services, then they
may treat them exactly as they treat other defendants, and this variable should not be significant.
However, if lower civil courts also favor this type of firms, then the Public service variable may
be significant in the Cour de cassation.
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4 Results
Table 1 reports the number of cases dealt with in the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’E´tat,
distinguishing appeals initiated by the plaintiff and defendant.
Cassation Conseil d’E´tat Total
Plaintiff appeal 187 (30.45%) 37 (6.03%) 224 (36.48%)
Defendant appeal 303 (49.35%) 87 (14.17%) 390 (63.52%)
Total 490 (79.80%) 124 (20.20%) 614
Table 1: Appeals
We observe that defendants appeal more often than plaintiffs in both courts (two thirds of the
total number of appeals). This could constitute a bias to be taken into account in the regressions
below. Indeed, it may be that defendants file for an appeal even when their chances of winning
are less than one half. Therefore, we should be careful when interpreting the coefficient of the
Defendant appeal variable.
The Conseil d’E´tat deals with far fewer cases than the Cour de cassation, since it only reviews about
20% of cases. However, no structural difference in the distribution of the cases between appeals
by plaintiffs and by defendants, or in the nature of the cases treated by both courts arises from
simple observation. This is confirmed by two-sample t-tests for equal variance and mean on
different variables.25
A pro-defendant bias in the lower courts, as long as it is perceived as such by judges from
the Supreme Courts, should give rise to a correction mechanism, that would be translated into
pro-plaintiff bias (H1) in the appeal outcome (see Shavell, 1995). Then, we should expect more
reversal decisions favorable to plaintiffs, and this effect should be stronger for cases dealt with
by the Conseil d’E´tat rather than by the Cour de cassation (H2). Last, the decision of upper courts
not to fully review a case but to send it back to the lower court is indicative of trust in the capacity
of the latter to deal properly with it. We thus also look at referral decisions by appellate courts,
the premises being that the Conseil d’E´tat should be more reluctant than the Cour de cassation
to send a case back if administrative tribunals are suspected of favoring the government as a
litigant (H3).
25The two-sample t-test is a traditional Fisher test comparing the variance and mean of same variables of two
populations. To confirm that the nature of cases is similar in both samples, we compare the cases according to their
legal characteristics: legal grounds invoked by appellant, natural assets damaged, and compliance with regulation.
The results of the two-sample t-tests are given in Appendix A.
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In analyzing the results, we proceed as follows. We first report the estimations explaining the
pro-defendant and reversal decisions. We then study decisions to refer cases back to lower
courts.
4.1 Pro-defendant and reversal decisions
Pro-defendant and reversal decisions can be linked in a structural though non observable way.
For this reason, we run bivariate Probit regressions explaining simultaneously the two vari-
ables. Indeed, these two variables are significantly correlated, confirming that we must rely on
a bivariate approach and not run separate regressions. Table 3 reports the results of our basic
regressions.
 Pro-defendant decisions. Let us start by analyzing the results regarding the pro-defendant
decisions (the left column for each model in Table 3). Coefficients reflect the marginal variation
in the chances of obtaining a pro-defendant decision with respect to a benchmark in which the
plaintiff initiates the appeal in the Cour de cassation to obtain compensation for environmental
harm caused by a defendant who failed to comply with the regulatory standards, who did not
have any public service mission and who deteriorated some water resource.
First, both courts tend to confirm the decisions adopted by the lower courts (trial and appeal
courts, and tribunals). This can be seen from the negative and strongly significant coefficients of
the Defendant appeal variable in all three models. Indeed, a defendant who appeals has 29% fewer
chances of obtaining a pro-defendant outcome than a plaintiff who appeals.26 This confirms the
strong tendency of appellate courts to uphold lower-court decisions as shown by Eisenberg and
Heise (2009), and particularly by Eisenberg, Fisher, and Rosen-Zvi (2011).27
Second, asymmetric treatment of defendants by the two courts is revealed by the negative and
26The coefficient of Defendant appeal measures the probabilityPr(Pro-defendant|Defendant appeal) of Pro-defendant
variable taking the value 1 when the value of Defendant appeal changes from 0 to 1. Recall, though, that Defendant
appeal is a binary variable noted 1 if the defendant appeals and 0 otherwise, i.e. if the plaintiff appeals, and that
Pro-defendant is also a binary variable noted 1 if the decision is pro-defendant and 0 otherwise, i.e. if the decision
is pro-plaintiff. Thus observing the chances of Pro-defendant taking the value 1 when Defendant appeal goes from 0
to 1 is equivalent to measuring the chances of Pro-defendant going from 1 to 0 when Defendant appeal goes from 1
to 0, which is the probability Pr(Pro-plaintiff|Plaintiff appeal) of a pro-plaintiff outcome when the plaintiff appeals.
Consequently, the coefficient of Defendant appeal which measures the correlation between Defendant appeal and Pro-
defendant also measures the correlation between Plaintiff appeal and Pro-plaintiff. With an affirmative behavior, the
chances of the appellant obtaining a positive outcome, being either the plaintiff or the defendant, are always lower
than the chances of the respondent doing so. This is why we describe the result as affirmative behaviour.
27The affirmance rate in Eisenberg et al. (2011) in both civil and criminal cases is about 70%, similar to the figure
usually obtained in mandatory courts and tribunals.
12
significant coefficient of the Conseil d’E´tat variable. Indeed a defendant has 11% less chances of
obtaining a favorable decision when the appeal takes place in the Conseil d’E´tat rather than in
the Cour de cassation. Defendants are thus treated differently depending on the court which is
in charge. This result strongly contradicts Amaral-Garcia and Garoupa (2012), since they do not
obtain any difference in the treatment of defendants between the civil and the administrative
sections of the Spanish Supreme Court. Given the outcome of our two-sample t-tests for equal
variance and mean, our finding cannot be related to any structural difference between cases that
our data do not allow us to observe, but rather come from greater severity of the Conseil d’E´tat
with respect to defendants.
Third, compliance with the regulation significantly increases the defendant’s chances of a fa-
vorable decision in both courts. This could be interpreted as the existence of a “defense for
compliance with regulation”, but one should be careful as this defense tends to be less often
accepted by judges as time goes by (see Bentata 2014).
 Reversal decisions. Coefficients in the right column of each model in Table 3 reflect the
marginal variation in the chances of obtaining a reversal decision with respect to a benchmark
in which the plaintiff initiates the appeal in the Cour de cassation to obtain compensation for en-
vironmental harm caused by a defendant who failed to comply with the regulatory standards,
who did not have any public service mission and who deteriorated some water resource. We
can see that an appeal from a defendant reduces the chances of obtaining a reversal decision. An
appeal by a defendant reduces the chances of obtaining a reversal by 16% when compared with
an appeal by a plaintiff. We have already seen that appeal courts tend to uphold lower court’s
decisions and, when they reverse it, they tend to favor the plaintiff. This could be interpreted
as a pro-plaintiff bias but one must be careful: it could just reflect the fact that defendants go
to appellate courts more easily than plaintiffs, maybe even when their chances of winning are
quite low (see the earlier comment on Table 1).
The chances of a reversal decision are 14% lower in the Conseil d’E´tat than in the Cour de cassation.
It thus seems that the Conseil d’E´tat is more affirmative than the Civil one. This tendency to
uphold the administrative tribunals’ decisions depends on the identity of the litigant filing the
appeal. Indeed, when we interact the Defendant appeal variable with the Conseil d’E´tat variable,
we see that a defendant appealing before the Conseil d’E´tat has 26% fewer chances of obtaining
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a reversal decision than if it was a plaintiff who appealed (see Table 4). Therefore, the Conseil
d’E´tat is more reluctant to reverse a decision than the Cour de cassation and, as shown in the Pro-
defendant regressions, when it reverses it, it is more favorable to plaintiffs. Indeed, a defendant
appealing in the Conseil d’E´tat has half the chance of obtaining a reversal decision as in the Cour
de cassation (see the elasticity of -0.12 for the Defendant appeal variable and the elasticity of -0.26
for the interaction term Defendant appeal*Conseil d’E´tat in Table 4).
Overall, the observation of pro-defendant and reversal decisions points to the same conclusion:
there is a difference in the treatment of litigants between the two upper courts. We summarize
our results so far as follows.
Result 1 : French upper courts tend to affirm lower courts’ decisions. When they reverse them, they
tend to favor the plaintiffs. This severity with defendants is greater in the Conseil d’E´tat than the Cour
de cassation.
4.2 Referral decisions
We provide a fresh insight into the decisions in upper courts by looking at their referral decisions
to lower courts. Their frequency can be considered as a proxy for the degree of trust of Supreme
Courts towards lower courts on their capacity of reviewing a case. In our regression, if the
coefficient for the Conseil d’E´tat variable is not significant, this would mean that both courts
behave the same way regarding referral decisions. However, if significant, then this would
suggest a difference between both courts in their trust toward lower courts and tribunals, a
negative coefficient indicating a lower degree of trust or the willingness to have a definitive
decision on the case. Whatever the underlying reason, a negative coefficient could indicate that
the Conseil d’E´tat adopts a corrective behavior with respect to the administrative tribunals.
From Table 5, we can see that the Conseil d’E´tat variable is significant, and negatively correlated
with referral decisions: a case presents 9% fewer chances of being referred back from the Conseil
d’E´tat than from the Cour de cassation.
The Public service variable is also significant. The chances of a referral decision for a private firm
providing public services are 15% lower than for ordinary private-sector firms. It seems that
upper courts are more reluctant to send these precise cases back to lower courts, despite the
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fact that the Public service variable is not correlated to pro-defendant and reversal decisions (see
Table 3).
Result 2 : The Conseil d’E´tat is more reluctant than the Cour de cassation to send the cases back to lower
courts.
Result 3 : Overall, the two French Supreme Courts behave differently. The pro-plaintiff bias of the Con-
seil d’E´tat could be indicative of a bias of the administrative tribunals in favor of public utilities and/or
the government.
5 Conclusions
This paper is a contribution to the empirical literature on courts’ decisions, based on an original
dataset of all French environmental cases brought before the supreme instances. Regressions
have shown clear-cut results: upper courts tend to uphold lower courts’ decisions and, when
they reverse them, they tend to favor the plaintiffs. The Conseil d’E´tat is harsher with defendants
than the Cour de cassation. In addition, the former is more reluctant than the latter to refer the
cases back to lower courts. This behavior of the Conseil d’E´tat could be indicative of a bias of the
administrative tribunals towards defendants, meaning public utilities and/or the government.
In this respect, our main findings contradict a series of results obtained earlier in the literature,
where either no difference could be detected in the treatment of the government and private
parties as litigants, or the government received favorable treatment.
The limitation on our analysis is obviously the fact that there could be a selection effect at work.
However, not having the history of the cases in the lower courts and even before trial, we cannot
control for it.
This analysis has been conducted for environmental cases, and it would be interesting to extend
it to other categories of cases. We keep this task for further work.
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Appendix A.
 Two-sample t-tests for equal variance and mean.
These tests measure the difference of variance and mean for different variables for two samples,
namely the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’E´tat. The null hypothesis (H0) is that both samples
have similar variance and mean. In Table 2, p-values are beyond the critical threshold of 0.1 for
each control variable, except Procedure and Sea which account for only 16 and 5 cases respec-
tively. Therefore, as far as control variables are concerned, H0 cannot be rejected, meaning that
18
t p-value
Defendant appeal 2.1019 0.0360
Pro-defendant decision -1.7216 0.0856
Reversal decision 1.9062 0.0571
Referral decision 2.8391 0.0047
Public service -0.1161 0.9076
Compensation 0.5530 0.5804
Compliance -0.0308 0.9754
Proof 0.0293 0.9767
Causality 1.2773 0.2020
Uncertainty -0.9135 0.3613
Procedure -1.9723 0.0950
Water -0.5533 0.5803
Soil -0.0045 0.9964
Air -1.1472 0.2518
Sea 1.7944 0.0732
Noise 1.2177 0.2238
Table 2: Two-sample t-tests
there is no structural difference on the corresponding variables between the two samples. On the
other hand, the three dependent variables and the Defendant appeal variable have significantly
different mean and variance in each sample. Consequently, we can conclude that for similar
cases, the Conseil d’E´tat and the Cour de cassation rule differently.
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Appendix B - For the convenience of the referees, not for publication
We first start by running separate regressions for the Conseil d’E´tat and for the Cour de cassation
explaining pro-defendant decisions (Table 6) and reversal decisions (Table 7). We use a Logit
model since regressed variables are binary. Both Tables 6 and 7 report marginal effects with
respect to a benchmark situation.
In Table 6, coefficients reflect the marginal variation in the chances of obtaining a pro-defendant
decision with respect to a benchmark in which the plaintiff initiates the appeal in the Cour de
cassation to obtain compensation for an environmental harm caused by a defendant who did not
comply with the regulatory standards, who did not have any public service mission and who
deteriorated some water resource.
Whatever the court, the mere action of filing an appeal for a defendant strongly reduces its
probability of obtaining a favorable decision. A defendant files an appeal in order to invalidate
a lower court’s decision. Hence, an upper court wishing in general to confirm lower courts’
decisions will take a decision that goes counter the appealing defendant.
Remark 1. One should be cautious in interpreting directly this first result as indicating a pro-
plaintiff behavior. Indeed, the Defendant appeal and Plaintiff appeal variables are symmetric - one
takes value 1 when the other takes value 0 - and the same for the Pro-defendant and Pro-plaintiff
variables. Therefore, we would have found the same coefficient and elasticity if we regressed
pro-plaintiff decisions by plaintiff appeal: the probability of obtaining a pro-defendant decision
when the defendant files the appeal is 26% lower than when the plaintiff files the appeal, but
the probability of obtaining a pro-plaintiff decision when the plaintiff files the appeal is also 26%
lower than when the defendant files the appeal. The negative coefficient of the Defendant appeal
variable just demonstrates some affirmance attitude from upper courts, which are quite prone
to confirm lower courts’ outcomes.
In Table 7, coefficients reflect the marginal variation in the chances of obtaining a reversal deci-
sion with respect to a benchmark in which the plaintiff files the appeal in the Cour de cassation
to obtain compensation for an environmental harm caused by a defendant who did not comply
with the regulatory standards, who did not have any public service mission and who deterio-
rated some water resource.
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The coefficient of the Defendant appeal variable is negative and significant, here too. The prob-
ability of obtaining a reversal decision is lower for a defendant who files an appeal than for a
plaintiff who files an appeal.
Overall, Tables 6 and 7 thus show that upper courts tend to confirm lower courts’ decisions and,
when they reverse it, they tend to favor the plaintiffs.
Remark 2. The coefficient of the Defendant appeal variable is three times larger in the Conseil d’E´tat
than in the Cour de cassation. This could suggest a stronger severity from the former than from
the latter. This remains to be confirmed by appropriate regressions later.
In our analysis, the central explicative variable is the Conseil d’E´tat. It is sometimes necessary to
interact variables to give strength to some conclusions. As said in Remark 1 above, the negative
coefficient of the Defendant appeal variable does not allow, in itself, to conclude on a pro-plaintiff
behavior of the Conseil d’E´tat in Table 6. But, in a model explaining the reversal decisions, a
variable interacting the Conseil d’E´tat (CE) with the Defendant appeal would allow to determine
whether there is a difference of treatment for defendants between the two courts. This interac-
tion variable is thus introduced in Tables 8 and 9 (as well as in the bivariate models in Table
4).
From Tables 8 and 9, we see that no other interaction with the Conseil d’E´tat is significant,28 then
none is included in the regressions.
Last, to ensure that the particular choice of a binary regression among the possible ones has
no influence on our results, we compare Logit and Probit models for all our regressions: pro-
defendant decisions with and without interaction with the Conseil d’E´tat (Tables 10 and 11), re-
versal decisions with and without the interaction (Tables 12 and 13).
For all the regressions, the results for Logit and Probit approaches are rigorously identical: same
significance, same elasticity, same R2 and even a same measure of concordance (C-stat). As a
consequence, it does not really matter which model is selected.
As regards the regressions for referral decisions, an additional variable needs to be included.
For obvious reasons, a referral decision to a lower court is strongly correlated with a reverse
28The interaction between the Conseil d’E´tat and the Procedure variables is significant in Table 8, but the Procedure
variable is not first order in our analysis: it represents an appeal filed by a party on the ground of a lack in the respect
of the legal procedure.
24
Table 6: Logit model of pro-defendant decisions
(Prodef = α0 + α1Defappeal + βiXi)
Conseil d’E´tat Cour de cassation
Restricted Complete Restricted Complete
Defendant appeal -3.628**** -4.375**** -1.773**** -1.817****
(0.929) (1.121) (0.238) (0.226)
Compliance 2.484*** 3.515*** 1.387**** 1.461****
(0.904) (1.202) (0.252) (0.265)
Public service n/a1 n/a1 -0.282 -0.480
(0.806) (0.823)
Legal ground
Compensation (benchmark)2 - -
Proof -2.624 -0.335
(1.978) (0.339)
Causality 0.401 -0.737
(2.062) (0.401)
Uncertainty 0.404 0.414
(1.980) (0.442)
Procedure -2.396 -0.355
(2.222) (0.392)
Polluted resource
Water (benchmark)2 - -
Soil -0.433 0.057
(1.726) (0.364)
Air -2.311 -0.184
(1.671) (0.381)
Sea n/a3 1.007
(0.700)
Noise -1.522 -0.222
(1.622) (0.316)
Constant 0.208 1.399 -0.799 -0.891
(2.931) (3.262) (1.174) (1.216)
Observations 124 124 490 490
Pseudo-R2 (Mc Fadden’s adj) 0.473 0.613 0.235 0.256
Notes. **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01. All the regressions include a year fixed effect. (1) The Public service variable is
associated to any private firm having a public service mission. Such cases are reviewed by civil courts unless the
firm obtained a privilege of public authorities (Pre´rogative de puissance publique). In our database, three cases fall in
this category and the decision was each time against the defendant. As a consequence, this variable perfectly
predicts a pro-plaintiff decision and has no statistical value. (2) In Logit/Probit regressions, binary variables
represent events studied with respect to a benchmark scenario. In our regressions, coefficients of the Legal ground
and Polluted resource variables are estimated as marginal effects with respect to a benchmark situation in which the
damaged resource is Water and the legal ground is the desire to obtain compensation. (3) Only in one case the
polluted resource is the sea in the whole set of judgments by the Conseil d’E´tat. Hence, this variable automatically
predicts a unique possible event and has no statistical value.
decision.29 Thus, the Reverse variable is added in Table 5. We have an endogeneity problem
29One should have in mind that a reversal decision can be partial - in which case it can be followed by a referral
decision - but it can also be complete. There are not enough cases for each situation to take into account in fine detail
the degree of reversal by the upper court in our analysis.
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Table 7: Logit model of reversal decisions
(Reverse = α0 + α1Defappeal + βiXi)
Conseil d’E´tat Cour de cassation
Restricted Complete Restricted Complete
Defendant appeal -1.464** -1.999** -0.710*** -0.599**
(0.656) (0.825) (0.233) (0.246)
Compliance 1.872** 1.841* 0.437* 0.575**
(0.859) (0.972) (0.245) (0.255)
Public service -0.938 -2.519 0.723 0.465
(1.807) (2.429) (0.733) (0.750)
Legal ground
Compensation (benchmark)1 - -
Proof -0.892 -0.323
(1.423) (0.355)
Causality -0.179 -1.195***
(1.448) (0.404)
Uncertainty 2.561 -0.544
(1.716) (0.456)
Procedure -0.581 -0.436
(1.324) (0.376)
Polluted resource
Water (benchmark)1 - -
Soil 0.701 -0.355
(1.188) (0.353)
Air 0.319 -0.585
(1.289) (0.390)
Sea n/a2 -1.198
(0.748)
Noise -1.123 0.047
(1.163) (0.313)
Constant -2.858** -2.676 -1.311 -1.232
(1.412) (1.935) (1.193) (1.227)
Observations 124 124 490 490
Pseudo-R2 (Mc Fadden’s adj) 0.209 0.301 0.08 0.107
Notes. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All the regressions include year fixed effects. (1) In Logit/Probit
regressions, binary variables represent events studied with respect to a benchmark scenario. In our regressions,
coefficients of the Legal ground and Polluted resource variables are estimated as marginal effects with respect to a
benchmark situation in which the damaged resource is Water and the legal ground is the desire to obtain
compensation. (2) Only in one case the polluted resource is the sea in the whole set of judgments by the Conseil
d’E´tat. Hence, this variable automatically predicts a unique possible event and has no statistical value.
in this regression since referral and reversal decisions both depend on common variables that
remain unobservable in our database. Since purely exogenous variables that could be used as
instruments are not available, we cannot really deal with this endogeneity problem. However,
it should be noticed that when running the following regression :
Refer = α0 + α1Defappeal + α2Reverse+ βiXi + ,
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the covariance between Reverse and residuals is very weak, since cov(Reverse, ) = 0.0088. The
above mentioned problem may thus be ignored.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 report tests for the reliability - or predictive power - of the previous regressions.
(1) The graph in the upper-left corner represents the marginal effects of our two independent
variables. As we can see, the Conseil d’E´tat variable lowers the chances of having a pro-defendant
outcome, a reversal decision and a referral decision at the 95% confidence interval, i.e. even
if we take the lower bound of the confidence interval, we observe that the chances of having
a pro-defendant outcome, a reversal decision and a referral decision in the Conseil d’E´tat are
respectively 4%, 5% and 2% lower than in the Cour de cassation.
(2) The graph in the upper-right corner represents the sensitivity and specificity of the model.
Sensitivity tests the model’s ability to identify positive results and specificity is the model’s
ability to predict negative results. Cut-off probability represents the different threshold above
which the predicted values of Defendant appeal are considered as being positive, i.e. Defendant
appeal=1.
(3) The graph in the downer-left corner represents the trade-off in sensitivity for specificity, i.e.
the model’s ability to detect true positive outcomes (sensitivity) while rejecting false negative
outcomes (1-specificity). The area under the curve (AUC) provides a graphic analysis of the
model’s goodness of fit, measuring the probability that an actual positive outcome has a higher
predicted probability than an actual negative outcome. According to Hosmer et al. (2013), an
AUC > 0.8 is considered as an excellent discrimination between true positive and false negative
outcomes, and an AUC between 0.7 and 0.8 is considered as an acceptable discrimination. Since
the AUC is equal to 0.82 for pro-defendant decisions, 0.72 for reversal decisions and 0.94 for
referral decisions, we can conclude that our three models fit correctly the data and provide
relevant estimations.
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Table 8: Pro-defendant decisions - interaction of all variables with CE
(Prodef = α0 + αiXi + βiCE ∗Xi)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Defendant appeal -1.819**** -1.583**** -1.663**** -1.748****
(0.211) (0.221) (0.236) (0.247)
Defendant appeal*CE -1.347*** -2.002**** -1.918*** -2.092***
(0.432) (0.576) (0.668) (0.748)
Public service 0.0233 -0.318 -0.582 -0.448
(0.775) (0.794) (0.826) (0.833)
Public service*CE 0.013 -0.273 -0.340 -0.320
(0.665) (0.654) (0.663) (0.672)
Compliance 1.375**** 1.426**** 1.447****
(0.239) (0.252) (0.262)
Compliance*CE 0.554 1.064 1.435
(0.495) (0.757) (0.903)
Legal ground
Proof -0.274 -0.392
(0.347) (0.357)
Proof*CE -1.278 -0.527
(0.830) (0.958)
Causality -0.819** -0.785**
(0.375) (0.390)
Causality*CE 0.497 1.050
(0.932) (1.059)
Uncertainty 0.388 0.445
(0.422) (0.455)
Uncertainty*CE 0.120 -0.975
(1.001) (1.244)
Procedure -0.381 -0.368
(0.368) (0.380)
Procedure*CE -2.257** -2.195*
(1.097) (1.133)
Polluted resource
Soil 0.0180
(0.368)
Soil*CE -2.000
(1.225)
Air -0.161
(0.387)
Air*CE -1.170
(1.242)
Sea 0.933
(0.684)
Noise -0.296
(0.323)
Noise*CE -0.667
(1.028)
Risk -0.465
(0.489)
Risk*CE 2.688**
(1.316)
Constant -12.00 -12.87 -11.64 -11.92
(403.6) (622.9) (507.0) (574.1)
Observations 609 609 609 607
Notes. **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 9: Reversal decisions - interaction of all variables with CE
(Reverse = α0 + αiXi + βiCE ∗Xi)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Defendant appeal -0.842**** -0.768**** -0.724*** -0.726***
(0.214) (0.220) (0.232) (0.238)
Defendant appeal*CE -1.688**** -1.693**** -1.962*** -1.869***
(0.476) (0.517) (0.633) (0.662)
Public service 0.882 0.755 0.600 -0.496
(0.718) (0.723) (0.734) (0.740)
Public service*CE -1.247 -1.286 -1.519 -2.188
(1.539) (1.590) (1.725) (1.822)
Compliance 0.419* 0.544** 0.558**
(0.234) (0.245) (0.254)
Compliance*CE -0.0972 -0.516 -0.770
(0.446) (0.637) (0.703)
Legal ground
Proof -0.201 -0.130
(0.334) (0.344)
Proof*CE -0.136 -0.807
(0.763) (0.924)
Causality -0.967** -1.036***
(0.382) (0.395)
Causality*CE 0.994 1.055
(0.852) (0.927)
Uncertainty -0.295 -0.245
(0.432) (0.472)
Uncertainty*CE 1.367 0.00273
(0.984) (1.255)
Procedure -0.242 -0.228
(0.358) (0.369)
Procedure*CE 0.00975 -0.358
(0.871) (0.924)
Polluted resource
Soil -0.258
(0.365)
Soil*CE 1.456
(0.914)
Air -0.614
(0.409)
Air*CE 0.186
(1.033)
Sea -0.692
(0.679)
Noise 0.125
(0.322)
Noise*CE -0.310
(0.0957)
Risk 0.0480
(0.0452)
Risk*CE 1.994
(1.277)
Constant 13.06 13.06 14.03 14.09
(684.9) (684.9) (684.9) (682.9)
Observations 579 579 579 574
Notes. **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure 1: Graphic tests for pro-defendant decisions
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Figure 2: Graphic tests for reverse decisions
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Figure 3: Graphic tests for referral decisions
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